Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment
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- Create Date：2021-09-28 09:54:17
- Update Date：2025-09-06
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- Author：Robert B. Brandom
- ISBN：0674543300
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Summary
What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee， say， or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower， like us？ To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves， philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition。 Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational， logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry。 Where accounts of the relation between language and mind have traditionally rested on the concept of representation， this book sets out an alternate approach based on inference， and on a conception of certain kinds of implicit assessment that become explicit in language。 Making It Explicit is the first attempt to work out in detail a theory that renders linguistic meaning in terms of use--in short， to explain how semantic content can be conferred on expressions and attitudes that are suitably caught up in social practices。
At the center of this enterprise is a notion of discursive commitment。 Being able to talk--and so in the fullest sense being able to think--is a matter of mastering the practices that govern such commitments， being able to keep track of one's own commitments and those of others。 Assessing the pragmatic significance of speech acts is a matter of explaining the explicit in terms of the implicit。 As he traces the inferential structure of the social practices within which things can be made conceptually explicit， the author defines the distinctively expressive role of logical vocabulary。 This expressive account of language， mind， and logic is， finally， an account of who we are。
At the center of this enterprise is a notion of discursive commitment。 Being able to talk--and so in the fullest sense being able to think--is a matter of mastering the practices that govern such commitments， being able to keep track of one's own commitments and those of others。 Assessing the pragmatic significance of speech acts is a matter of explaining the explicit in terms of the implicit。 As he traces the inferential structure of the social practices within which things can be made conceptually explicit， the author defines the distinctively expressive role of logical vocabulary。 This expressive account of language， mind， and logic is， finally， an account of who we are。
Reviews
Lucas Johnston
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Read first half， skimmed second。 Long， hard， technical， dry。
Benedikt Pétursson
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What a fucking fantastic book。 Highly recommend to those interested in pragmatism or postmodernism， provides the first （that I've read） systematic attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for relativism。 What a fucking fantastic book。 Highly recommend to those interested in pragmatism or postmodernism， provides the first （that I've read） systematic attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for relativism。 。。。more
Zo
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Astonishing work in its ambition， thoroughness， and， possibly， success？ There is so much here that Brandom attempts to do that it is impossible to keep it all in my head for assessment， especially because most of the topics would require much more study for me to feel confident。 But I felt like I was able to follow most of what was going on， and generally found myself nodding my head in agreement with much of Brandom's thought。 His pragmatic explanation of the notion of reasoning and linguistic Astonishing work in its ambition， thoroughness， and， possibly， success？ There is so much here that Brandom attempts to do that it is impossible to keep it all in my head for assessment， especially because most of the topics would require much more study for me to feel confident。 But I felt like I was able to follow most of what was going on， and generally found myself nodding my head in agreement with much of Brandom's thought。 His pragmatic explanation of the notion of reasoning and linguistic meaning （inferentialism）， his logical expressivism， the deflationary accounts of truth/reference， and the account of how social practices lead to representational concepts all seem deeply right （and in many ways a "making explicit" of many of LW's fundamental insights）。 Where I am most unsure is Brandom's inability to construe the development of intentionality and normativity from the non-normative aside from appealing to language， which as Dennett points out seems insufficient， especially if we think about the reverse engineering question。 Along with that his account of the objectivity of conceptual norms seems uneasy to me， and more of a scientific antirealism than he would want to own up to？ I'm also not sure how to tie his account in with contemporary phil of mind （such as a PP story）。 All of these are big issues which threaten crucial parts of his project， and I am not sure to what degree they could be resolved in his work， or if they can't be resolved how much that calls into questions other aspects of the work？ I don't know。 I need to think way more about pretty much everything herein。 Regardless， this is a truly exciting and amazing work in what it tries to do as an account of the nature of rationality/sapience/language。 。。。more
Alina
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The late Wittgenstein's groundbreaking insight was that the meaning of a linguistic expression is constituted the （practical） use of that expression。 Ordinary language philosophy sprung from this insight。 But philosophers of this tradition tend to take for granted that meaning is constituted by use， and investigate other aspects of the pragmatics of language that follow from this assumption。 Brandom's work is groundbreaking; he faces， head-on， the question of exactly how the use of an expression The late Wittgenstein's groundbreaking insight was that the meaning of a linguistic expression is constituted the （practical） use of that expression。 Ordinary language philosophy sprung from this insight。 But philosophers of this tradition tend to take for granted that meaning is constituted by use， and investigate other aspects of the pragmatics of language that follow from this assumption。 Brandom's work is groundbreaking; he faces， head-on， the question of exactly how the use of an expression can constitute its meaning。 His account is systematic， precise， and detailed。 Brandom describes his account as a combination of inferentialism and pragmatism regarding meaning。 Inferentialism is opposed to representationalism。 According to inferentialism， the meaning of a claim is derived from the inferential roles that the claim serves （more of this below）。 In contrast， representationalism holds that meaning of a claim is based in the referents of the subsentential elements of that claim （e。g。 singular terms and predicates）。 According to pragmatism， we need to start off with examining our actual practices regarding language use， and then show how formal aspects of language are based in these lived practices （more of this below）。 This is opposed to varieties of formalism， which start with taking theoretical concepts for granted， and using these to explain the pragmatics of language。 We need to think of language as used by members of a linguistic community。 As we go about our lives in a pre-reflective manner， all our actions， experiences， and uses of speech presuppose our commitments to various facts （e。g。， when I avoid looking at the sun， this act presupposes that looking at the sun damages vision）。 According to Brandom， while we use language for many different purposes， these boil down to the basic use of assertion （so by analyzing the mechanics of assertion， we can discover how all other cases of language get their meanings）。 Assertions are the building blocks of this fundamental purpose of language: to ask for people's reasons （e。g。， for the behaviors， claims， and attitudes they have）， and to provide reasons in response to such demands。 Thus， when we use language， we make implicitly presupposed facts explicit。 The reasons we would give in response to such a demand constitute the propositional contents of an assertion。 Such reasons may be premises that we presume and that lead to our assertion， as the conclusion; or they may be consequences of our assertion， new claims to which we must commit in order to maintain rational consistency。 For example， I assert "Staring at the sun is bad"， and you demand my reasons for this assertion。 If my presupposed premise was "The ultraviolet radiation is very powerful and can damage physical aspects of the eye" （along with other premises needed to amount to my particular assertion）， these reasons were implicitly constitutive of the meaning of my assertion。 Alternatively， if my presupposed premise was "It hurts my head when I look directly at the sun"， my assertion would've had a different meaning according to this line of reasoning。 The criteria of justification （and thus the reasons we would provide， and the meaning that is fixed of our assertions） are socially-normatively regulated。 Each member of a linguistic community has deontic statuses of commitment， entitlement， and responsibility。 We are committed to various claims， to which all our beliefs and behaviors should be consistent。 We are entitled to a commitment if we can justify it in the face of others' demanding for our reasons。 We are responsible for our commitments by acknowledging that others hold us accountable （for living up to our commitments）， and that we will be subject to punishments if we fail （e。g。， others will revoke our entitlements）。 Every member of a community is governed by such normative concerns。 This allows for our assertions to have determinate， regular contents， and for us to communicate and understand each other。 While the contents of this book definitely deserve a perfect rating， the writing style barely deserves a single star。 Brandom writes with unnecessary repetition and jargon。 His paragraphs often involve presenting the same idea in two， three， or more ways， when the idea could be more clearly and forcefully presented with choosing just one way。 He too often "reminds" the reader what he had presented earlier in the book， by just repeating content。 Rather than choose a simple term to represent a concept， he will string together multiple technical adjectives to serve as the official term， which is repeated everywhere; he could've just explained the concept in all its complexity once， and then give it a simple name， and readers would be able to understand。 In order to get through this book， I had to learn to skillfully skim it。 This was not initially straightforward to do。 But eventually it became intuitive to predict which parts would be important， and which would not be。 Brandom's core theory is presented over chapters 3 and 4。 Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the philosophical problems to which his theory responds， and the background and competing theories that help situated his ideas。 Chapters 5-8 show how Brandom's theory can account for core semantic concepts such as truth， reference， and singular terms。 These 3 different parts of the book， I think， could be read quite independently （especially the last part）。 The introduction is useful for understanding his theory， but the implications of this theory spanning the second half of the book would be of interest only to readers steeped in debates about formal semantic concepts。 I am not such a reader， so I skipped the last two chapters; I do not think this compromised the my understanding of his core theory。I would recommend this book to anyone interested in pragmatic approaches to language， theories of meaning， or social normativity。 。。。more
Aislan
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Um livro grandioso com um projeto de mesma qualidade。 Finalmente terminei esta primeira leitura com milhares de anotações。 Várias possibilidades de desenvolvimento filosófico， nos mais diversos âmbitos。 Feliz e aliviado em terminar esta leitura。
jeremiah
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Read about a third of this for a course。 Brandom is an intellectual tomb raider and isn't nearly as provocative a writer as Rorty。 Might be something more for me here next time around。 Read about a third of this for a course。 Brandom is an intellectual tomb raider and isn't nearly as provocative a writer as Rorty。 Might be something more for me here next time around。 。。。more
Ageel Ali
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In Making It Explicit， Robert Brandom argues that semantic content can be explicated through the social discursive practices of asking and giving reasons。 In this project， he systematically constructs a model for discursive practices that eschews the representational idioms which he replaces with expressive vocabulary。 Instead of employing the synthetic-analytic distinction and the other distinction of inner-outer to clarify conceptual content， Brandom uses the material inferences （taken from Se In Making It Explicit， Robert Brandom argues that semantic content can be explicated through the social discursive practices of asking and giving reasons。 In this project， he systematically constructs a model for discursive practices that eschews the representational idioms which he replaces with expressive vocabulary。 Instead of employing the synthetic-analytic distinction and the other distinction of inner-outer to clarify conceptual content， Brandom uses the material inferences （taken from Sellars's paper ''Inference and Meaning''） to interpret semantic content。 In this line of thought， semantic content is determined through material incompatibilities/compatibilities of doxastic commitments implicit in social discursive practices。 However， these commitments and entitlements are made explicit by logical vocabulary。 For instance， the use of singular terms as subsentential component is defined substitutionally to be symmetrically substituted-for expressions in what Brandom calls substitution-inferential-commitment。 In a similar fashion， referential terms such as demonstratives and indexicals are treated as anaphorically dependent on recurrence commitments。 On the problem of experience， Brandom takes an eliminativist position since he considers empirical content to be already explicated by the endorsement of doxastic commitment implicit in the differential reliable responses of noninferential reportings to the presence of perceptual objects。 。。。more
Dan Yingst
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Brandom never writes a sentence when he could write 200 pages。 Interesting ideas， but Christ he's a bad writer。 Brandom never writes a sentence when he could write 200 pages。 Interesting ideas， but Christ he's a bad writer。 。。。more
SVG
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